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I. INTRODUCTION
On September 7, 1999, the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC" or "Commission") issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order in
which it ruled "that a broadcast station should not be allowed to refuse a
request for political advertising time solely on the ground that the station
does not sell or program such lengths of time."' This ruling came in
response to a petition for reconsideration of the FCC's October 3, 1994
Declaratory Ruling2 filed by the Media Access Project ("MAP") and
People for the American Way ("PAW").3 The 1994 DeclaratoryRulingconsistent with most FCC precedent-held "that broadcast stations need
not sell or furnish legally qualified candidates for federal office time for
political advertising in increments other than those which the station either
sold commercial advertisers or programmed during the one-year period
preceding the election."5 Commissioner Harold W. Furchtgott-Roth
dissented on the ground that the FCC should have upheld its policy of
requiring "regulatory parity as between candidates and advertisers with
respect to time."" Whether the FCC had a consistent policy with regard to
access parity remains uncertain, but Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth
advocated what has been the most sensible approach employed by the FCC
to date.
This Note argues that the FCC should adopt Commissioner
Furchtgott-Roth's position on reasonable access. In making this argument
Part II discusses the source of the reasonable access requirement. Part Ill
tracks the FCC's attempts at clarifying its reasonable access policy,
including discussions of the 1978 Policy Statement, departures from the
1978 Policy Statement, Supreme Court review of the FCC's reasonable
access policy, the 1991 Report and Order, the 1994 DeclaratoryRuling,
1. Petition for Reconsideration by People for the American Way and Media Access
Project, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 17 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 186, para. 2 (1999)
[hereinafter PAW/MAP, Order].
2. Request for Declaratory Ruling of Nat'l Ass'n Broad., Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 5778, 76 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 200 (1994) [hereinafter Broadcasters,
Memorandum Opinion].
3. Declaratory Ruling of Nat'l Ass'n Broad., Reply Comments, DA 92-1478, 1 (Mar.
1, 1993) (on file with the FCC) [hereinafter PAW/MAP, Reply Comments].
4. The Commission's 1978 PolicyStatement articulates the rule applied by the FCC in
its 1994 DeclaratoryRuling and is consistent with most, but not all, Commission policy that
predates the 1999 ruling. Commission's Policy in Enforcing § 312(a)(7), Report and Order,
68 F.C.C.2d 1079,43 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1029 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 Policy Statement].
5. PAW/MAP, Order,supra note 1, para. 1.
6. Id. at 190.
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and the PAW/MAP Order. Part IV discusses the fault of the PAW/MAP
Order,and the merit of Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth's dissent.

II. THE SOURCE OF THE REASONABLE ACCESS REQUIREMENT
The controversy regarding the right of access to broadcast media for
advertising by candidates for federal political office has existed for a long
time. Prior to 1971, broadcast media licensees were subject to a series of
policies developed by the FCC known as the "public interest standard". 7
Under this standard, "some time had to be given to political issues, but an
individual candidate could claim no personal right of access unless his
opponent used the station and no distinction was drawn between federal,
state, and local elections."8
Thus, under the pre-1971 public interest standard, individual political
candidates did not have an affirmative, enforceable right to advertise using
broadcast media.9 On the contrary, broadcast "stations were required to
make reasonable, good faith judgments about the importance and interest of
particular races,"' and allocate accordingly the time devoted to political
affairs between individual candidate advertisements and general coverage."
As a result, if a broadcast station dedicated ample coverage to political
affairs, it did not have to worry a great deal about individual requests for
especially if doing so burdened the station's
airtime by political candidates,
12
programming schedule.
The FCC was forced to abandon this part of the public interest
standard13 upon passage of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
7. CBS, Inc. v. FCC 453 U.S. 367, 377-78 (1981). The public interest standard

consisted of fourteen elements, one of which was the requirement that adequate broadcast
coverage be dedicated to political matters.
8. Id. at 378-79.
9. See In Re Application of Summa Corp., Las Vegas, Nev. for Renewal of License of
Station KLAS-TV, Report and Order,43 F.C.C.2d 602, 28 Rad. Reg.2d (P & IF)768 (1973)

[hereinafter Summa Corp., Report].

10. CBS, 453 U.S. at 378.
11. See Inquiry Concerning Political Advertisement Requirements, Decision, 40 F.C.C.
342 (1962); Inquiry Concerning Political Advertising Requirements, Decision, 40 F.C.C.
346 (1962); Inquiry Concerning Political Advertising Requirements, Decision, 40 F.C.C.

347 (1962).

12. "The licensee was not required to sell time to any particular candidate ...
Corp., Report, supra note 9, at 603.
13. State and local political races are still subject to the public interest standard. CBS,
453 U.S. at 379 n.6. See also In Re Complaint of Anthony Martin-Trigona, Memorandum
Opinion and Order,64 F.C.C.2d 1087, para. 14, 40 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1189 (1977) (in
."Summa

which the FCC denied the protection of § 312(a)(7) to a candidate in a city mayoral race
because he was not a candidate for a federal political office) [hereinafter Martin-Trigona,
Memorandum Opinionand Order].

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53

("FECA"). 4 The FECA, which consists of four titles, 5 was designed, in
part, "to give candidates for public office greater access to the media so
that they may better explain their stand on the issues and thereby more fully
and completely inform the voters."' 6 Title I of the FECA contained the
statutory provision from which the current controversy surrounding the
right of access to broadcast media by federal political
candidates
7
emanates-the provision codified at 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7).1
Section 312(a)(7) is known as the "reasonable access" clause. It
provides the FCC with the authority to revoke a station license or
construction permit "for willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable
access to or to permit purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the use of
a broadcasting station by a legally qualified candidate for [flederal elective
office on behalf of his candidacy."
This provision has been controversial from its inception because the
terms "reasonable access" and "reasonable amounts of time" are inherently
ambiguous. Moreover, the FCC assumed the responsibility of applying and
enforcing § 312(a)(7) without meaningful guidance from Congress.' 9 In
fact, Congress indicated little more than its intent for § 312(a)(7) to provide
candidates with greater access to the media for the purpose of informing
the voting public.20 As a result, federal political candidates and broadcast
stations, upon passage of § 312(a)(7), attempted to influence the FCC's'
interpretation of "reasonable access" and "reasonable amounts of time.' 21
Federal political candidates wanted the FCC to adopt a working definition
of the terms that would provide them with strong, enforceable rights of
access to broadcast media during elections.22 Broadcast stations,
14. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1994).
15. Id.
16. 1978 PolicyStatement, supranote 4, para. 31 (quoting 117 CONG. REc. 28,792). The
quote from the CongressionalRecord was an explanation of the bill's purpose by Senator
Pastore, one of its sponsors. 117 CONG. REc. 28,792. The Senate Commerce Committee
later incorporated his statement of purpose for § 312(a)(7) in a Report. S. REP. No. 92-96, at
20(1971).
17. CBS, 453 U.S. at 377.

18. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1994).
19. 1978 Policy Statement, supra note 4, para. 31.

20. Id.
21. Id. paras. 2-20.
22. See Martin-Trigona, Memorandum Opinionand Order,supra note 13; Hon. Donald
W. Riegle v. WKZO-TV, 59 F.C.C.2d 1314 (1976); Campaign '76 Media Comms. v. WGN
and WGN-TV, 58 F.C.C.2d 1142, 36 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 865 (1976) [hereinafter

Campaign '76 Media Communications]; Complaint by Don C. Smith, 49 F.C.C.2d 678, 31
Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1309 (1974); Complaint of Hon. Pete Flaherty, 48 F.C.C.2d 838, 31
Rad. Reg.2d 259 (P & F) (1974); Summa Corp., Report, supra note 9; Complaint by
Humphrey for President Campaign, 34 F.C.C.2d 471,24 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 84 (1972).
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conversely, sought a definition of the terms that would maintain the status
quo by preserving the pre-1971 public interest standard.
Not surprisingly, the FCC adopted something of a middle ground. It
dismissed "the contention that Section 312(a)(7) was meant merely as a
codification of the Commission's already existing policy concerning
political broadcasts."2' Likewise, it dismissed the federal political
candidates' suggestion that the terms be read to impose rigid, formalized
rules, under which broadcasters would be forced to provide special rights
of access to candidates independent of their programming needs and
advertising policies for commercial advertisers. 24 Instead, the Commission
read § 312(a)(7) to "impose[] an additional obligation on the general
mandate to operate in the public interest."25 This position, the FCC
asserted, was consistent with Congress's express desire that "licensees
afford candidates for Federal office a special right of access to a
broadcasting station which no other group enjoyed.'2 6 The FCC tempered
its position, however, by noting that § 312(a)(7) was not "intended to
require stations to accept all requests for political time during election
campaigns to the exclusion of all or most other types of programming or
advertising."27 The Commission stated:
[A]Ithough we recognize a right of access to prime time programming,
we decline[] to recognize any right, by a Federal candidate, to program
time of any particular or minimum duration. Nor d[o]. we recognize
any right, by a Federal candidate, to have his programming or
announcement given any particular placement-in terms of a specific
date and/or specific time-during prime time, or during any other
portion of the broadcast day.
In deciding when federal political candidates should receive airtime,
the FCC deferred "to the reasonable, good faith judgment of licensees as to
what constitutes 'reasonable access' under all the circumstances present in
a particular case." 29 The Commission's position gave federal political
candidates a right to purchase time for political advertisements in
23. 1978 Policy Statement, supranote 4, para. 34.

24. Id. paras. 39-40.
25. Id. para. 33.
26. Id. para. 38; see also Columbia Broad. Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
94(1973).
27. Summa Corp., Report, supra note 9, at 604; see also Use of Broad. Cablecast
Facilities, Public Notice, 37 Fed. Reg. 5796, 5804 (Mar. 16, 1972) (noting that as
"[i]mportant as an informed electorate is in our society, there are other elements in the
public interest standard, and the public is entitled to other kinds of programnning than
political.').
28. Complaint of Hon. Pete Flaherty, supranote 22, para. 29.
29. 1978 PolicyStatement, supranote 4, para. 1.
30. See Kennedy for President Comm., Memorandum Opinion and Order,80 F.C.C.2d
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increments either sold to commercial advertisers or programmed during the
one-year period preceding an election. 3 What remained unclear was the
extent to which the FCC required broadcast stations to accommodate the
particular desires of candidates for airtime when doing so would disrupt a
station's programming schedule-that is, how inconvenient did a
candidate's request for airtime have to be to warrant refusal by the
broadcast station?
A.

The 1978 Policy Statement

The FCC attempted to clarify its interpretation of § 312(a)(7) in its
1978 Policy Statement.32 This Report and Order responded directly to the
concerns of broadcast stations about the difficulties associated with the
promulgation of rigid rules given the "diversity of circumstances with
which each licensee is faced during an election period. 33 The prospect of
mandatory compliance with rigid rules frightened many broadcast stations
not only because of the potential complications in programming, but also
because of the severe penalty for noncompliance-revocation of their
licenses. 34
The FCC's 1978 Policy Statement, however, tried to make it easy for
broadcast stations to avoid losing their licenses. In fact, the Commission
believed that its policy would, in most cases, leave undisturbed the
practices of stations affording federal candidates access to broadcast
times. 35 The Commission stated that it would utilize § 312(a)(7) only to
ensure that federal political candidates would "be at least on par with
commercial advertisers."36 The concept of access parity between
commercial and political advertisers became a principle of § 312(a)(7)
interpretation and underscored one of the Commission's ultimate policies
of the 1978 Policy Statement-that it was "generally unreasonable for a
licensee to follow a policy of flatly banning access by a Federal candidate
to any of the classes and lengths of program or spot time in the same

93, 46 Rad. Reg.2d (P & r)1539 (1980) [hereinafter Kennedy for President, Order].
31. See PAW/MAP, Order,supra note 1, para. 1.
32. 1978 Policy Statement, supra note 4.
33. Id para. 2.
34. Id. para. 3; see Summa Corp., Report, supra note 9, at 604-05 ("[R]ather than
engaging in any attempt to formulate specific rules for licensee compliance with the
requirement of the new section, we remain committed to leaving licenses and candidates
free to work out solutions for reasonable access through discussion, negotiations, and
cooperation, subject only to the standard of reasonableness and good faith.").
35. 1978 PolicyStatement, supra note 4, para. 42.
36. Id. para. 41.
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periods which the station offers to commercial advertisers"'

In turn, the
1978 Policy Statement highlighted the Commission's belief "that the best
method for achieving a balance between the desires of candidates for
airtime and the commitments of licensees to the broadcast of other types of
programming is to rely on the reasonable, good faith discretion of
individual licensees. '38
The FCC provided guidance to broadcast stations on how best to
exercise their discretion. It suggested that they consider such factors as "the
unavailability of particular classes of time[,] a multiplicity of candidates[,
and] the specific desires of candidates. '39 It is important to note, however,
that the FCC forbade broadcast stations from contemplating the merit of an
individual candidate's "desires" in deciding whether to grant a request for
access.40 In addition, if a broadcast station refused a candidate's request for
airtime, or responded to a request with a more limited counteroffer, the
Commission required that it proVide the candidate and the FCC with a
written explanation of its decision. Despite these rules, though, the FCC
claimed that the 1978 Policy Statement was intended only to require that
"licensee[s] follow [their] usual commercial practices, '"1' and treat federal
political candidates like commercial advertisers.

Departurefrom the 1978 Policy Statement
The FCC changed its tone shortly after the release of the 1978 Policy
Statement. This change was not part of an official statement made by the
FCC in which it announced departure from, or alteration to, past
interpretation of § 312(a)(7); rather, the change became evident in the
enforcement measures taken by the FCC against broadcast stations. The
B.

FCC's decision in In Re Complaint of Kennedy for PresidentCommittee

provides an example. 42 The Kennedy for President Committee tried to
purchase five-, ten-, and thirty-minute prime-time programs from the

37. Id. (emphasis added).
38. Id.para. 39.
39. IaL para.41.
40. See Campaign '76 Media Communications, supra note 22. The FCC found the
broadcast station to have violated § 312(a)(7) for disallowing the sale of spots that are under
five minutes to political candidates solely because "of its belief that 'no spokesman can state
his position on political matters in a broadcast of less than five minutes."' Id at 1144. The
FCC went on to explain that it found "no reason to conclude that in enacting § 312(a)(7)
Congress intended to vest in licensees the power to supplant a candidate's determination
that his political interests would best be served by the purchase of spot announcements
rather than of broadcasts of five minutes in duration." Id
41. 1978 PolicyStatement, supranote 4, para. 42.
42. See Kennedy for President, Order,supranote 30.
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broadcast station, BBI.43 BBI refused each request, and the Committee
subsequently filed a § 312(a)(7) complaint with the FCC*4 The
Committee's complaint emphasized the importance to Kennedy's campaign
of the time requested, his supposed "entitlement" to the purchase of thirtyminute prime-time programs, and the unreasonable nature of BBI's
refusal 4 5 BBI responded to the Committee's complaint by discussing its
reasons for refusing to sell the time in terms of the "factors" from the 1978
Policy Statement-exactly the showing required for compliance with FCC
policy.46 BBI noted (1) the amount of time that it had already afforded
Senator Kennedy;47 (2) the disruptive impact of the requested sales on its
programming schedule;48 and (3) the number of other candidates who could
request equal access time.49 Further, BBI underscored that it had only
refused to sell to the Committee airtime in increments unavailable to
commercial advertisers -- a justification grounded in one of the
foundational principles of the 1978 Policy Statement, access parity between
commercial advertisers and political candidates.51
The FCC sharply rejected BBI's response to the Committee's
complaint.5 This would not have been so strange had the FCC confined its
analysis to an examination of BBI's application of the factors from the
1978 Policy Statement. The FCC, however, after finding unpersuasive
BBI's application of the factors to the Committee's request,53 introduced
additional standards that BBI could not have foreseen. Most notably, the
FCC all but ignored the concept of access parity between commercial
advertisers and political candidates. 4 It found unreasonable BBI's "blanket
ban on the sale of 5-, 10- and 30-minute program time," 55 even though BBI
did not offer programs in such increments to commercial advertisers. As if
that were not enough, the FCC went on to hold that, "for the purpose of
administering Section 312(a)(7), a station accepting a half-hour program
from a network or broadcasting local half-hour programs may not refuse

43. Id. para. 2.
44. Id. paras. 2-4.

45. Id.
46. Id.paras. 5-10.
47. Id. para. 5.
48. Id.
49. Id. para. 6.

50. Id.
51. 1978 Policy Statement, supra note 4, para. 41.
52. Kennedy for President, Order,supra note 30, paras. 11, 24.

53. Id.
54. Id. paras. 16, 19.
55. Id. para. 16.
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half-hour program requests from candidates solely on the ground that it
does not sell such programs to commercial advertisers."56 Clearly, the FCC
demanded more of BBI than mere access parity-it demanded affirmative
accommodation of Kennedy's wishes largely irrespective of the extent to
which they posed complications for BBI's programming schedule.
The FCC continued to invoke in subsequent cases the demanding
standard for § 312(a)(7) compliance that it applied in Kennedy for
President Committee. In Re Complaint of Ed Noble for U.S. Senate
Committee58
Committeei and In Re Complaint of Ed Clarkfor President
provide two examples. In both cases, the FCC charged the broadcast
stations with the duty to be especially sensitive to the special desires of
political candidates and to accommodate those desires unless doing so was
substantially disruptive to their programming schedules. This requirement
applied even if the broadcast stations were accommodating political
candidates to an extent equal to or greater than commercial advertisers.
In Ed Noble, the candidate requested a series of five-minute programs
during prime time. 9 The station sold some five-minute programs to the
candidate, but not as many as had been requested.60 To justify its refusal,
the station noted the potential for equal opportunity requests, the amount of
time previously sold to the candidate, the short notice given to the station
by the candidate, and the substantial disruption to its programming
schedule that would result if the requests were granted. 6' In its analysis of
the broadcast station's justification for the refusal, the FCC noted: In
addition to the "public interest factors" cited by the broadcasters to justify
their denial of time, "a broadcaster should be required to demonstrate the
extent to which he has attempted to tailor his offer of airtime to be as
reasonably responsive as possible (given countervailing factors) to a
particular candidate's stated purpose in seeking airtime.'" 2 The broadcast
station convinced the FCC that it had been reasonably responsive to the
candidate's requests in this case by demonstrating that it was not
technically feasible given the time involved-that is, it was essentially

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

ld. para. 19.
79 F.C.C.2d 903,48 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F)61 (1980) [hereinafter Ed Noble].

87 F.C.C.2d 417,48 Rad. Reg.2d (P &F)433 (1980) [hereinafter Ed Clark].
Ed Noble, supra note 57, at 904.
Id.
Id. at905.
Id. at 908 (quoting Complaint of Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee, Inc.

Against the ABC, CBS, &NBC Television Networks, Memorandum Opinion and Order,74
F.C.C.2d 657, 668, 46 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F)899, 908 (1979) [hereinafter Carter-Mondale,

OrderlI]).
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impossible for it to delay network programming by five minutes. 63 The
FCC afforded less weight to the other factors demonstrated by the
broadcast station.64
The broadcast station in Ed Clark was subjected to a similar standard.
The FCC, early in its discussion, stated that "broadcasters need not
necessarily sell all the time requested by a candidate."6 5 The opinion made
clear, though, that to avoid the sale of airtime requested by a candidate, a
broadcast station must be able to prove that doing so would either be
impossible or result in unusual hardship. The Commission said, "We
recognize that the process of editing five minutes from a regularly
scheduled program is not easy. However, a broadcaster cannot use this
reason to avoid the sale of five-minute prime time program time.' 66 To the
contrary, the Commission went on to say, "'Only substantial disruption of a
broadcaster's regular programming is entitled to weight in the balancing
process.''67 The issue, then, becomes the definition of "substantial
disruption" of a broadcaster's regular programming. Under the standard
employed by the FCC in Ed Noble and Ed Clark, a "substantial disruption"
in regular programming makes accommodation of the candidate's request
nearly impossible.
C. Supreme Court Review of the FCC"sHeightenedStandard
The Supreme Court, in CBS, Inc. v. FCC ("Carter/Mondale"),
reviewed the FCC's new, more demanding interpretation of § 312(a)(7)
developed in Kennedyfor PresidentCommittee, Ed Noble, and Ed Clark."
In this case, the Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee "requested each of
the three major television networks to provide time for a 30-minute
program between 8 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. on either the 4th, 5th, 6th, or 7th of
December 1979, ' ' 69 but "[t]he networks declined to make the requested time
available., 70 The Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee found
unreasonable the networks' explanations for their refusals of its airtime
requests, alleged that the networks had violated their duties under §
312(a)(7), and filed a complaint with the FCC.7' The FCC ruled that the
63. Id.
at 905-06.
64. Id at909.
65. Ed Clark, supra note 58, at 421.

66. Id. at 422.
67. Id. (quoting CBS, Inc. v. FCC, No. 79-2403, slip op. at 36 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 14,
1980)).

68.
69.
70.
71.

453 U.S. 367 (1981).
Id. at 371.
Id. at 372.
Id. at 373-74.
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networks had violated their duties under § 312(a)(7). 72 As a result, "[t]he
networks, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 402, then petitioned for review of the
Commission's Orders in the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit.

73

The D.C. Circuit affirmed the FCC's decision. 74

The Supreme Court "granted certiorari to consider whether the [FCC]
properly construed 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) and determined that petitioners
failed to provide 'reasonable access to... the use of a broadcasting station'

as required by the statute."5 The majority supported the FCC in
Carter/Mondale.6 It approached the issue from the perspective that the
FCC was "the experienced administrative agency long entrusted by

Congress with the regulation of broadcasting, and... responsible for
implementing and enforcing § 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act." As
a result, the Court stated that the FCC's construction of § 312(a)(7) was
entitled to judicial deference "unless there are compelling indications that it
is wrong."78 The majority found no such indications.
The Carter/Mondale opinion first confirmed that the language and
legislative history of § 312(a)(7) supported the FCC's interpretation that it
created affirmative rights of reasonable access to broadcast media for
federal political candidates. 79 In so doing, it also confirmed the FCC's
position that § 312(a)(7) was not a codification of the pre-1971 public
interest standard8 0
The Supreme Court also affirmed the criteria that the FCC required
broadcast stations to use in evaluating requests for airtime by federal

72. Id. at 374. The FCC ruled on this matter twice. The first decision was handed down
on November 20, 1979. Complaint of Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee, Inc. Against
the ABC, CBS, & NBC Television Networks, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 74
F.C.C.2d 631, 46 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 829 (1979). The networks were given until
November 26, 1979, to indicate how they would fulfill their obligation under § 312(a)(7).
The networks, however, sought reconsideration of the decision. On November 28, 1979, for
the second time, the FCC arrived at the same decision. Carter-Mondale, OrderII, supra note
62.
73. CBS, 453 U.S. at 374.
74. Id.at 375; CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 629 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
75. CBS, 453 U.S. at 371 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1994)).
76. See CBS, 453 U.S. 367. The opinion is written as though FCC policy had been
entirely consistent prior to the Carter/Mondalecase. See id.
77. Id at 390.
78. Id. (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,381 (1969)).
79. Id. at 384-85.
80. Id. at 379. In a dissenting opinion, however, Justice White argued that the
legislative history reveals that Congress actually did intend simply to codify the pre-1971
public interest standard, and that § 312(a)(7) did little more than aid in the enforcement of
the pre-existing standard by adding a more severe penalty for noncompliance. Id. at 404-05.
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political candidates.:" The individual factors that the Court discussedtaken from the 1978 Policy Statement-included: (1) that broadcasters need
not sell airtime to candidates before the start of a campaign; 2 (2) that, once
a campaign has begun, requests for airtime must be considered on an
individual basis;" (3) that broadcasters may consider the amount of time
previously sold to a candidate; 4 (4) that broadcasters may consider the
disruptive impact of a candidate's requests on regular programming;85 and
(5) that broadcasters may consider "the likelihood of requests for time by
rival candidates under the equal opportunities provision of § 315(a). 8 6 The
Court emphasized that broadcast stations could not use the factors as
pretexts for avoiding their reasonable access responsibilities under §
312(a)(7) and that, "to justify a negative response, [they] must cite a
realistic danger of substantial program disruption.., or... an excessive
number of equal time requests. '8 7 In turn, the Court also affirmed the
FCC's policy of showing deference to a broadcast station's determination,
with regard to a candidate's request for airtime, as long as the broadcast
station considered the appropriate factors and acted reasonably and in good
faith.s8
The Carter/Mondaleopinion, however, failed to incorporate into its
holding one of the overriding principles of the 1978 Policy Statement-the
principle of access parity. In fact, one could read the language in the case to
require broadcast stations to consider all requests for access to airtime,
even if in increments other than those sold to commercial advertisers or
programmed in the preceding year.
The dissent found the majority opinion disturbing. The dissent argued
that the majority had not only oversimplified the issue presented by the
case, 89 but had supported Commission policy contrary to the legislative
history of § 312(a)(7), unduly burdensome to broadcast stations, and
violative of broadcast stations' editorial freedom. 90
Kennedy for President Committee, Ed Noble, Ed Clark; and
Carterlondaleall suggest that the FCC had become unconcerned both
with access parity and with affording deference to the good faith decisions
81. Id. at 386-87.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 387.

84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.

87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 397.

90. Id at 397-419.
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of broadcasters as to when to sell airtime to political candidates. The
concepts of access parity and deference to broadcasters had been
incorporated into the opinions of these cases, but seemed to have little
effect on their outcomes. Instead, the FCC and the Supreme Court seemed
to rely heavily on the extent to which broadcast stations worked to
accommodate the special desires of political candidates.
D.

The 1991 Report and Order

In 1991, the FCC released a Report and Order entitled In the Matter
of Codificationof the Commission's PoliticalProgrammingPolicies.9' This
Report and Order contained a detailed discussion of the2 Commission's
policy on the duties of broadcast stations under § 312(a)(7)?
The FCC began its discussion by reiterating that it would not adopt
rigid rules to define "reasonable access." The Commission said, "[We]
continueo to believe that formal rules would not be practical and that we
should continue to rely upon the reasonable, good faith judgments of
licensees to provide reasonable access to federal candidates." 93 Following
cases such as Ed Noble and Ed Clark, however, one could have expected
the concept of "deference to the broadcaster's judgment" to be subordinate
to the concept of "accommodation of the candidate's desires." Surprisingly,
though, the 1991 Report and Order did not speak to the concept of
accommodating the special desires of candidates for airtime. Instead, it
listed nine guidelines, taken from the Commission's 1978 Policy Statement
and the Supreme Court's Carter/Mondale case, that broadcast stations
should consider when responding to a political candidate's request for

airtime?.
The Report and Order's nine guidelines failed to mention the duty of
broadcast stations to accommodate the special desires of political
candidates for airtime, but did mention that "[l]icensees may not adopt a
policy that flatly bans federal candidates from access to the types, lengths,
and classes of time which they sell to commercial advertisers."95 Thus,
despite cases such as Ed Noble and Ed Clarkthat held it unacceptable for a
91. Codification of the Conm'n's Political Programming Policies, Report and Order,7
F.C.C.R. 678, 70 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 239 (1991), modified by Codification of the
Comm'n's Political Programming Policies, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 7 F.C.C.R.

4611,70 Rad. Reg.2d (P &F) 1331 (1992).
92. Id. paras. 6-23. The Report and Order also discussed the Commission's policies
regarding equal access opportunities under § 315(a), lowest unit charge duties under §
315(b), and political file requirements. Id paras. 24-124.

93. Id. para. 8.
94. Id. para. 9.
95. Id.
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broadcaster to flatly ban the sale of any increment of time to a political
candidate, the Commission again asserted that broadcast stations must
allow access parity between commercial advertisers and political
candidates.
The Commission reflected its departure from "special
accommodation" in the character of its actions following the 1991 Report
and Order. Two examples include letters to attorney Arthur R. Block!' and
Michael Steven Levinson. 97 Each letter responded to complaints
implicating rights under § 312(a)(7). For the most part, the FCC's general
approach to the complaint was like that of older cases-it examined the
extent to which the broadcast station used the "factors" in deciding to
refuse the candidate's request for airtime." These letters differed from
earlier cases, 99 though, to the extent that they did not suggest that the FCC
required licensees to extend extra efforts to accommodate the special
desires of candidates. Rather, each stated that "if broadcasters take the
appropriate factors into account and act reasonably and in good faith, their
decisions will be entitled to deference even if the Commission's analysis
would have differed in the first instance."'0 While the FCC had included
similar language in earlier cases, many cases decided during the period
between the 1978 Policy Statement and the 1991 Report and Order in
reality showed little deference to the judgment of the broadcast station. The
FCC's letters to Block and Levinson, however, afforded meaningful
deference to the broadcast stations. Each broadcast station explained its
refusal of the candidate's request for airtime in terms of the factors, and the
FCC accepted its explanations.'0 '
E.

The 1994 Declaratory Ruling-A Victory for the Broadcasters

In 1994, the National Association of Broadcasters ("NAB") asked the
FCC to clarify its policy with regard to access parity.'0 In its petition for a
Declaratory Ruling, the NAB asserted that federal political candidates
interpreted both the Commission's 1978 Policy Statement and its ruling in
Ed Noble to entitle them to odd-length program times neither sold to
96. Arthur R. Block, Letter, 7 F.C.C.RL 1784, 70 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1024 (1992)
[hereinafter Block, Letter].
97. Michael Steven Levinson, Letter, 7 F.C.C.R. 1457, 70 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1027
(1992) [hereinafter Levinson, Letter].
98. See Block, Letter, supra note 96; see also Levinson, Letter,supra note 97.
99. See, e.g., Ed Noble, supranote 57, at 907.
100. Block, Letter, supra note 96, at 1785; Levinson, Letter, supra note 97, at 1457
(quoting CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 387(1981)).
101. See Block, Letter,supra note 96; see also Levinson, Letter,supra note 97.
102. Broadcasters, MemorandumOpinion, supranote 2.
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03
commercial advertisers nor regularly programmed by the station.
Political candidates, the NAB argued, believed that the 1978 Policy
Statement forbade all blanket bans on the sale of airtime to them. l 0 The
NAB supported its position with dictum from Ed Noble. The NAB said:
In dictum, the staff also indicated that if candidates request five-minute
programs far enough in advance, licensees may have to go so far as to
preempt one-half hour of network time, air the candidate's five-minute
program "and fill[] the remaining 25 minutes with local programming
or with other candidates' programming.' '
Moreover, the NAB argued:
These passages have led some to conclude that licensees cannot refuse
to sell odd-length programs to candidates in any time period, so long as
the request is not made at the 'last minute." Under this logic, a
candidate would have the right to buy a 13-minute prime time
program,1' 6 regardless of the disruption to the station's schedule, so
long as the request were [sic] made well in advance of election day.
NAB believes that this is a misinterpretation of the fundamental intent
of the Commission's reasonable access decisions.0 7
The NAB argued that the "blanket ban" language taken from the 1978
Policy Statement was intended only to apply to increments of time sold to
commercial advertisers or regularly programmed by the station. ' Os As a
result, the NAB sought "a declaratory ruling that broadcast stations need
not provide legally qualified candidates for federal office with program
time in increments other than those which the station ordinarily sells to
commercial advertisers or which it ordinarily programs."'
The People for the American Way and Media Access Project
("PAWIMAP") submitted reply comments in opposition to NAB's petition
for a Declaratory Ruling."0 PAW/MAP argued that § 312(a)(7) prohibits
blanket bans on the sale of advertising time to federal political candidates
in any particular length, irrespective of the broadcast station's policy for
the sale of time to commercial advertisers and its regular programming

103. Pet. from NAB, to Milton 0. Gross, Chief, Political Programming Branch, FCC 1-2
(Aug. 18, 1992) (an file with the FCC).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2 (quoting Ed Noble, supranote 57, at 909-10).
106. The NAB included a footnote in the passage stating, "The Clinton campaign
prepared such a program for showing at the Democratic National Convention, although they
apparently have plans to expand it to 30 minutes for broadcast. Still, the § 312(a)(7)
construction presented in Ed Noble apparently would put no obligation on any Federal
candidate to make such changes." Id.
at 2 n.1 1.
107. Id. at2.
108. Id. at 2-3.
109. Broadcasters, Memorandum Opinion,supranote 2, para. 1.
110. Id.para.5.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53

practices."' PAW/MAP structured their argument around the theory that
NAB misread Commission precedent and that, in truth, the FCC never
interpreted § 312(a)(7) to permit broadcasters to ban the sale of any length
of advertising time to federal political candidates." 2 As a part of this
argument, PAW/MAP contradicted the NAB's contention that Ed Noble
represented a departure from longstanding Commission policy, asserting
that the decision was consistent with both prior and subsequent FCC
decisions." 3 PAW/MAP stated, "These decisions establish that the
Commission has always understood 312(a)(7) to prohibit any blanket
policy on sales of times of particular lengths, regardless of whether a
broadcaster does not program or sell commercial time in those lengths. The
Commission has never spoken to the contrary."'" 4 PAW/MAP applied their
interpretation of the Commission's policy on "reasonable access" to
support their ultimate position that "requests for time must be considered
on a case-by-case basis,"' 5 and that broadcasters may refuse requests for
time only after "a sincere examination of all the circumstances with a view
towards trying to accommodate the candidates' request."" 6
The FCC responded to the NAB's request for a Declaratory Ruling
with refreshing clarity. After considering the positions advanced by the
NAB and PAW/MAP, it ruled that broadcasters need only "provide access
to qualified federal candidates consistent with their own sales and
programming decisions."' 7 In short, the FCC ruled for the NAB, rejecting
entirely the position advanced by PAW/MAP.
The 1994 DeclaratoryRuling was significant because it cleared up
ambiguities in the FCC's interpretation of § 312(a)(7) that befuddled
broadcasters since the Commission's decision in Ed Noble. The
DeclaratoryRuling held that (1) limitations and flat bans on the kinds and
lengths of time offered to commercial advertisers during the year preceding
a particular election period were prohibited;"' (2) program time in the
lengths programmed by the station in the year preceding a particular

111. PAWMAP, Reply Comments, supranote 3.

112. Id. at 1-3.
113. Id. at2-3.
114. Id. at 3. This passage was followed by a lengthy footnote stating that those
broadcast stations that had echoed the NAB's request for a Declaratory Ruling, including
CBS, Inc., A.-. Belo, and Hearst, had misconstrued the language of the 1978 Policy
Statement by reading it to allow them to refuse advertising time to federal political

candidates in increments other than those sold to commercial advertisers. Id. at n.3.
115. Id. at 1.

116. Id. at 1-2.
117. Broadcasters, MemorandumOpinion, supranote 2, para. 10.
118. Id.
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election, regardless of whether offered to commercial advertisers, must be
made available; 9 and (3) Ed Noble, to the extent it suggested anything
contrary to points (1) and (2), was superseded.'20 The broadcast stations
applauded this holding because a requirement that they provide advertising
time to candidates in increments neither sold to commercial advertisers nor
programmed in their regular schedule would impose severe burdens on
them, including the difficulty of delaying programming to accommodate
advertisements of nonstandard length and the resultant difficulty in meeting
their contractual obligations with syndicators and networks.' 2 ' In addition,
because it superseded the dictum in Ed Noble, the ruling foreclosed the
possibility that broadcast stations would have to sort out the technical and
contractual complications associated with the sale of odd-length advertising
time should a qualified candidate request such time sufficiently far in
advance.'22
F. The 1999 Memorandum Opinion and Order-Defeatof the
Broadcasters
The reasonable access standard that the FCC set in the 1994
DeclaratoryRuling was short lived. In 1999, PAW/MAP filed a petition
with the FCC for reconsideration of the 1994 DeclaratoryRuling. The FCC
reconsidered PAW/MAP's argument, accepted their position, and
overturned the 1994 ruling.'2 In fact, to the disappointment of broadcast
stations, the 1599 ruling was a near return to the standard that the
Commission had embraced in the early 1980s-the standard that required
broadcast stations to cater to the individual desires of qualified federal
political candidates. 24 The FCC held "that a broadcast station should not be
allowed to refuse a request for political advertising time solely on the
'
ground that the station does not sell or program such lengths of time."' 25
Clearly, this holding did not resurrect the dictum from Ed Noble 26 that
suggested broadcast stations should accommodate requests by qualified
candidates for advertising time in nonstandard increments if submitted far
enough in advance. It did, however, overturn the heart of the 1994
Declaratory Ruling, which held that broadcast stations could impose
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id. para. 11.
Idpara. 4.
Id.
para. II.
PAW/MAP, Order,supranote 1, para. 11.
CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367,387 (1981).
PAW/MAP, Order,supranote 1, para. 2.
Ed Noble, supranote 57,910.
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blanket bans on the sale of advertising time in increments other than those
sold to commercial advertisers or programmed during the one-year period
preceding an election.' 27 The FCC explained its change in position by
holding the 1994 DeclaratoryRuling to have been a departure from an
established "framework" laid out in earlier cases-a framework that
prohibited 28
flat bans on the sale of program time in nonstandard
increments.
As a result of 1999 ruling, the FCC abandoned not only the holding of
the 1994 ruling, but the analysis that supported that holding, as well. The
1994 ruling required broadcast stations to "provide access to qualified
federal candidates consistent with their own sales and programming
decisions,' 29 in part because the sale of advertising time in nonstandard
lengths created severe technical difficulties for broadcast stations" In the
1999 decision, the FCC acknowledged that the sale of advertising time in
nonstandard lengths imposed technical burdens on broadcast stations, but
ruled that "disruption to normal programming" was just one of a number of
factors that broadcast stations must take into account when evaluating a
qualified candidate's request for a nonstandard increment of advertising
time. 31 The FCC said, 'The disruption to regular programming that would
be caused by granting a request for a nonstandard length of time, while
clearly relevant, must be considered in light of whether the broadcaster
could make adjustments in its schedule that would accommodate the
candidate's needs.' 32 As a result, programming disruption, commercial
sales practices, and general program scheduling practices could no longer
stand on their own as reasons for denying a candidate's request for any
length of advertising time.1 On the contrary, the 1999 decision imposed
the obligation on broadcast stations to consider
how they could
34
instance.
every
in
desires
candidates'
accommodate
Commissioner Harold W. Furchtgott-Roth dissented. He asserted that
the 1994 Declaratory Ruling "[did] not suffer from legal error and...
policy considerations cut in favor of establishing a clearer rule regarding
the duties of broadcasters to sell time."' 35 With regard to legal
considerations, he argued that the 1999 decision misinterpreted the 1978
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

PAW/MAP, Order,supra note 1, para. 1.
Id. para. 11.
Broadcasters, Memorandum Opinion,supra note 2, para. 10.
Id.para. 11.
PAW/MAP, Order,supra note 1, para. 2.
Id. para. 13.
Id. paras. 2, 13.
Id. para. 15.
Id. at 190 (Comnm'r Furchtgott-Roth, dissenting).
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Policy Statement by reading it to prohibit all flat bans on the sale of
advertising time to qualified candidates. He noted:
That decision did no4 however, generally prohibit across-the-board
policies. Rather, it prohibited across-the-board policies that deny
candidates the chance to buy time under the same terms as commercial
advertisers. To repeat: "Licensees may not adopt a policy that flatly
lengths, and classes
bans federal candidatesfrom access to the types, 36
of time which they sell to commercial advertisers"
In short, the Commissioner believed that the "linchpin of petitioners'
argument' and the underlying theory of the Order could not be squared
Policy Statement-the source from which both drew their
with the 1978
37
authority.
also asserted that policy
Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth
considerations weighed in favor of maintaining the 1994 Declaratory
Ruling. In his opinion, the 1999 Memorandum Opinionand Order,unlike
the 1994 Declaratory Ruling, provided broadcast stations with too little
guidance on the definition of "reasonableness," as well as too few "general
principles to help [them] better understand, ex ante, their obligations in this
area-such as simple equal treatment standards."'3 9 In turn, he argued that
requiring a "full-scale negotiation and compromise every single time that a
federal candidate makes a request to purchase time... [would] imposel]
great transaction costs on the [broadcast] stations."' 4 All of these
unfortunate effects, he suggested, would be avoided if the Commission
adopted a reading of § 312(a)(7) that, consistent with the 1978 Policy
simply put political candidates on par with commercial
Statement, would
41
advertisers.1

I. THE 1999 MEMORANDUM OPINIONAND ORDER-A
PERVERSION OF § 312(a)(7) AND THE MEANING OF

REASONABLE ACCESS
The language and history of § 312(a)(7) support the analysis and
conclusion of Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth's dissent to the 1999
Memorandum Opinion and Order. The plain text of § 312(a)(7), its
relationship to the pre-1971 public interest standard, the terms of the 1978
Policy Statement, and policy considerations all lead to the conclusion that
136. Id. at 190-91 (quoting 1978 Policy Statement, supranote 4, para. 55).
137. PAW/MAP, Order,supranote 1, para.2.
138. Id.
at 191.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. 1d.
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the 1994 DeclaratoryRuling is an accurate and workable interpretation of §
312(a)(7).
A.

The PlainLanguage of§ 312(a)(7)

Broadcast stations and federal political candidates dispute the correct
interpretation of "reasonable access" as defined by the Communications
Act of 1934. The resolution of the dispute lies in understanding how
Congress intended for "reasonable" to modify "access." To gain that
understanding, consider the section's plain language. Section 312(a)(7)
states:
(a) Revocation of station license or construction permit
The Commission may revoke any station license or construction
permit(7) for willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access to or to
permit purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the use of a
broadcasting station by a legally qualified candidate for Federal
elective office on behalf of his candidacy.
Section 312 does not define the adjective "reasonable." By contrast, §
312(f) contains definitions for "willful" and "repeated."' Congress's
failure to define "reasonable," in light of it defining "willful" and
"repeated," makes it proper to assume that Congress meant for the word to
carry its ordinary and usual definition. "Reasonable" ordinarily is
synonymous with "sensible," "rational," and "moderate",1---not
"affirmative," "special," or "guaranteed."
When § 312(a)(7) is read with the usual definition of
"reasonableness" in mind, the holding from the 1994 DeclaratoryRuling
comports nicely with its language. That ruling held that "broadcasters
[must] provide access to qualified federal candidates consistent with their
own sales and programming decisions."' 46 That is, they had to provide
sensible or moderate access to federal political candidates, but not special
or greater access than that offered to commercial advertisers. The 1999
ruling, however, requires an unusual definition of "reasonableness." Its
mandate that broadcast stations give special consideration to requests for
airtime by qualified candidates in increments not offered to commercial
advertisers, as Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth noted in his dissent,
"elevates federal candidates to a status that is not just on a par with, but
143. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1994).
144. Id.§ 312(f)(l)-(2) (defining "willful" and "repeated").
145. WEBSTER'sTHmRDNwDICrIONARY 1892 (3d ed. 1993).
146. Broadcasters, Memorandum Opinion,supra note 2, para. 10.
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superior to, commercial advertisers."' 47 That interpretation of § 312(a)(7)
does not square with its plain language. "[R]easonable treatment is equal
treatment,"' 4 and had Congress intended for § 312(a)(7) to require
something other than equal treatment, it would have described the time and
access that broadcast stations must provide to federal candidates with a
word other than "reasonable."
B.

Section 312(a)(7) and the Pre-1971 PublicInterestStandard

The relationship between § 312(a)(7) and the pre-1971 public interest
standard also suggests that Congress intended for "reasonableness" to carry
its ordinary definition. The public interest standard required that broadcast
stations allot airtime to political affairs, but did not require that broadcast
stations sell airtime to individual candidates for advertising. 49 In fact, if
political affairs received adequate airtime, the pre-1971 public interest
standard did not require broadcast stations to sell advertising time to any
candidate in any increment of time, irrespective of the station's sales and
programming practices.' 50 Because the pre-1971 public interest standard
placed no emphasis on affirmative rights of access for individual
candidates, Congress likely would have used more forceful language had it
intended a radical departure from that standard in adopting § 312(a)(7).
Moving from a system that provided candidates with no individual rights of
access to one that provides candidates with rights of access equal to those
of commercial advertisers seems more "reasonable" than a move to a
system that provides candidates with not only individual rights of access,
but rights far greater than those enjoyed by any other group.
C. Reasonableness Under the 1978 Policy Statement
The concept of "reasonableness" as equal treatment or access parity is
also incorporated into the plain language of the 1978 Policy Statement.
Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth was correct in noting that:
A careful reading of [the 1978] Policy Statement indicates that the
1994 Commission correctly understood it to establish regulatory parity
as between candidates and advertisers with respect to time. That
Statement specifically concludes:
We believe it to be generally unreasonable for a licensee to
follow a policy of flatly banning access by a federal candidate to
any of the classes and lengths of program or spot time in the
same periods which the station offers to commercial
147. PAW/MAP, Order,supranote 1, at 191 (Comm'r Furchtgott-Roth, dissenting).
148. Id.
149. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
150. Sunma Corp., Report, supranote 9.
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advertisers ....
[Thus,] [l]icensees may not adopt a policy that flatly bans federal
candidates from access to the types, lengths, and classes of time which
they sell to commercial advertisers.
It is difficult to read these passages as articulating anything but a clear
intention by Congress to give federal candidates access to broadcast
stations equal to that of commercial advertisers. The FCC, however,
managed to do so. In striking down the concept of access parity, it stated,
"In effect, the [19941 Declaratory Ruling permitted what amounts to an
'across-the-board' policy, or flat ban, on the sale of program time in nonstandard increments.' 52 While that statement is factually correct, the FCC
erred in holding it contrary to the intention of the 1978 Policy Statement
and, ultimately, Congress. The FCC's rule in the 1999 Memorandum
Opinion and Order can rally no support from the 1978 Policy Statement,
and is inconsistent with the plain language of § 312(a)(7).
D.

Policy Considerationsthat Favorthe 1994 Declaratory Ruling

The 1994 DeclaratoryRuling is superior to the 1999 Memorandum
Opinion and Order for policy reasons, as well. The 1994 Declaratory
Ruling provides broadcast stations with a concrete standard against which
reasonable access requests must be considered. If a candidate requested an
increment of time either sold to commercial advertisers or programmed in
the preceding year, the request merited full consideration. If the candidate
requested something different, the broadcast station was not obligated to
give it full consideration. That standard allows broadcast stations to plan.
They may enter into programming contracts and know that reasonable
access requests will not interfere with their contractual obligations.
Likewise, the 1994 DeclaratoryRuling allows broadcast stations to know in
exactly what increments they must be prepared to sell advertising time to
qualified federal political candidates. No such standard exists under the
1999 Memorandum Opinionand Order.
The 1994 DeclaratoryRuling also imposes fewer transaction costs on
broadcast stations. 53 It allows for certain situations under which broadcast
stations are not required to give full consideration to reasonable access
requests. The 1999 Memorandum Opinion and Order,however, "require[s]
broadcasters to engage in full-scale negotiation and compromise every
single time that a federal candidate makes a request to purchase time...
151.
(citing
152.
153.

PAW/MAP, Order, supra note 1, at 190 (Comm'r Furchtgott-Roth, dissenting)
1978 Policy Statement, supra note 4,paras. 41, 55).
Id.para. 11.
Id. at 191.
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[and] imposes great transaction costs on the stations."' Such expenditures
are unnecessary and, as Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth stated, "should not
be underestimated."' 55
IV. CONCLUSION
The FCC's 1999 Memorandum Opinion and Order ruled "that a
broadcast station should not be allowed to refuse a request for political
advertising time solely on the ground that the station does not sell or
program such lengths of time.' 5 6 This ruling ran contrary to the FCC's
1994 DeclaratoryRuling, as well as long-standing Commission precedent
based on the 1978 Policy Statement. The shift to the 1999 Memorandum
Opinion and Order from the 1994 Declaratory Ruling is misguided. The
plain language of § 312(a)(7), its relationship to the pre-1971 public
interest standard, the plain language of the 1978 Policy Statement, and
policy considerations all point to the conclusion that the 1994 Declaratory
Ruling accurately and workably interprets § 312(a)(7). Commissioner
Furchtgott-Roth's dissent from the 1999 Memorandum Opinion and Order
hit the mark; the 1994 DeclaratoryRuling should continue to control.

154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.para. 2.

